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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 05-1649
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.
MARCOS SANTIAGO,
Appellant
________________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
District Court Judge: The Honorable Timothy J. Savage
(Criminal No. 03-00157-1)
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
April 27, 2006
BEFORE: AMBRO and FUENTES, Circuit Judges, and IRENAS,* District Judge.

(Filed May 10, 2006)
_______________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________________

*

Honorable Joseph E. Irenas, Senior District Judge for the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Marcos Santiago appeals his conviction for interference with commerce by robbery
under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. He argues, first, that his prosecution was
impermissible under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, and second,
that the District Court erred in its instructions to the jury regarding the required effect of
the defendant’s conduct on interstate commerce. We reject both of Santiago’s claims and
affirm the conviction.1
I. BACKGROUND
Because we write only for the parties, our summary of the facts is abbreviated. In
January 2004, Marcos Santiago (“Santiago”) and his brother, Alfred Santiago, were
indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on
charges of participating in three armed robberies of hotels in the area of Lancaster,
Pennsylvania. Santiago was charged with conspiracy to interfere with and interference
with commerce by robbery under the Hobbs Act, firearm possession, carjacking, and
related counts. The cases of the two brothers were severed. Santiago’s case went to trial
in March 2004, and he was convicted of interference with commerce by robbery and
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The District Court had jurisdiction over this federal criminal case pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3231. This Court has jurisdiction over Santiago’s appeal of his conviction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review in considering Santiago’s
challenge to the constitutionality of his prosecution under the Hobbs Act and to the
District Court’s interpretation of the Hobbs Act in its jury instructions. See United States
v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 2005).
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several firearm possession charges. In February 2005, Santiago was sentenced to a total
of 402 months (33.5 years) in prison.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Constitutionality of the Hobbs Act as Applied to Santiago
Santiago asserts that his conviction pursuant to the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951,
was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Hobbs
Act provides, inter alia, that
[w]hoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or
the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or
extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical
violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do
anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Santiago argues, with reference to various excerpts from the
legislative history of the Hobbs Act, that the Act was intended to specifically target
robbery and extortion of truck drivers and shippers attempting to deliver goods into cities.
He contends that extending the Act to “local” crimes such as hotel robbery is
impermissible under United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In Lopez, the Supreme
Court held that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause when it
passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act, because that statute was unrelated to economic
activity. Id. at 560-67.
Santiago’s claim cannot succeed under this Court’s jurisprudence, which has
affirmed since Lopez that the Hobbs Act may be applied to robberies involving a minimal
3

impact on interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Clausen, 328 F.3d 708, 710-11
(3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting claim under Lopez that the Hobbs Act is unconstitutional as
applied to robberies of local Philadelphia businesses); United States v. Haywood, 363
F.3d 200, 211 n.7 (3d Cir. 2004) (concluding in a Hobbs Act case involving a robbery of
a Virgin Islands bar that evidence that the bar sold beer imported from the mainland
United States was sufficient evidence of interstate commerce to support federal
jurisdiction).
At trial, the government satisfied its burden of showing an impact on interstate
commerce. Representatives from each of the three robbed hotels (the Ramada Inn, the
Days Inn, and the Host Resort) testified. The representatives stated that the each hotel is
part of a national organization of hotels and that each hotel receives a significant number
of customers from out of state. Each hotel also receives services and supplies from out of
state. Thus, the government was within its authority in prosecuting Santiago under the
Hobbs Act, and Santiago’s Commerce Clause claim must fail.
B. Jury Instructions
Relatedly, Santiago challenges the District Court’s jury instructions regarding the
interstate commerce requirement under the Hobbs Act. The Court instructed the jury that:
If you find that the defendant knowingly obtained another’s property against
that person’s will by robbery, you must then decide whether this action
would affect interstate commerce in any way or to any degree. You must
determine whether there is an actual or potential [e]ffect on commerce
between two or more states. This means any action which interferes with,
changes or alters the movement or transportation or flow of goods,
4

merchandise, money or other property in commerce. The defendant need
not have intended or anticipated an [e]ffect on interstate commerce.
Santiago asserts that the District Court erred in instructing the jury that only a minimal
effect on interstate commerce was necessary for conviction. As noted above, Santiago’s
contention is flatly wrong under the relevant precedents of this Court. See, e.g., United
States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 762-63 (3d Cir. 2005) (approving Hobbs Act jury
instructions requiring a finding that the charged acts “‘potentially caused’ just a ‘minimal’
effect on interstate commerce”); Clausen, 328 F.3d at 711 (holding that only a de
minimis effect on interstate commerce need be proven to satisfy the jurisdictional element
of the Hobbs Act). We therefore reject Santiago’s appeal on this basis, and affirm the
judgment of the District Court.
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